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THINKABLE MERGERS: THE FCC's EVOLVING PUBLIC
INTEREST STANDARD
Jason E. Friedrich
At the end of the decade there will be only a few lead-
ing communications companies. We intend to be one
of them.
1
In a vibrantly competitive environment, having five




The Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996
Act") 3 was intended to usher in a new era of com-
petition in the communications industry.4 De-
spite the numerous changes the 1996 Act intro-
1 Letter from Ray Smith and Ivan Seidenberg, both of
Bell Atlantic Corporation, to Bell Atlantic Shareowners, The
New Bell Atlantic, (1997) (on file with the CoMMLAw CON-
SPECTIJS).
2 Separate Statement of Commissioner Rachelle B.
Chong, In re Application of NYNEX and Bell Atlantic for
Consent to Transfer Control of NYNEX Corporation and Its
Subsidiaries, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd.
19985, 20126 (1997).
3 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp.
1996)).
4 See generally 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (1996) (prefacing the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 as an act "[t]o promote
competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower
prices and higher quality services for American telecommuni-
cations consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of
new telecommunications technologies").
5 The phrase "public interest" originally appeared in the
Radio Act of 1927. Erwin G. Krasnow, The "Public Interest"
Standard: The Elusive Search for the Holy Grail, Oct. 22,
1997, at 7, (on file with CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS), (citing
Newton N. Minow and Craig L. Lamay, Standard in the Waste-
land, Children, Television and the First Amendment at 4 (1995)).
The legislative history of the 1927 Act, however, offers no ex-
planation of its origins. Id. One explanation is that when the
drafters of the Radio Act reached an impasse in their attempt
to define a standard for the FCC, a young lawyer on loan to
the Senate from the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
suggested the words "public interest, convenience and neces-
sity" (the standard used by the ICC) and the drafters agreed.
Id. This case of legislative coincidence has spawned immense
scholarly debate in the field of communications policy. Id.
6 See In re Application of NYNEX and Bell Atlantic for
Consent to Transfer Control of NYNEX Corporation and Its
duced, the Federal Communications
Commission's ("FCC" or "Commission") vague
mandate to act in "the public interest" remained. 5
Pursuant to Sections 214(a) and 310(d) of the
Act, the FCC still must affirmatively find that the
transfer of licenses and other authorizations un-
derlying a telecommunications merger are in the
public interest before allowing the transfer of
licenses.6 Given the 1996 Act's goal of heighten-
ing competition, the FCC will now only find a tele-
communications merger 7 to be in the public in-
terest if the merger will enhance competition."
Subsidiaries, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd.
19985, para. 2 (1997) (hereinafter Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Or-
der).
7 See generally William H. Reid and Ronald Alan Weiner,
FCC Reform: Governing Requires a New Standard, 49 FED. COMM.
L.J. 289, 291 (1997) (explaining that convergence is rapidly
changing the nature of communications law and policy).
The boundaries between different communications services,
and who is offering those services, are increasingly blurred.
Since the early 1990's mergers were thought to be necessary
in preparation for the convergence of computers and tele-
communications. See Erin M. Reilly, The Telecommunications
Industry in 1993: The Year of the Merger, 2 CoMMLAw CONSPEC-
TUS 95, 96 (1994). The telecommunications mergers referred
to in this Comment are mergers between companies whose
principal business is in telecommunications but may also
have interests in, for example, the wireless industry or In-
ternet access services. FCC merger approval for mass media
mergers are often concerned with other content issues, pre-
serving a diversity of voices for example. See generally Mike
Harrington, A-B-C, See You Real Soon: Broadcast Media Mergers
and Ensuring a 'Diversity of Voices', 38 B.C. L. REV. 497 (1997).
8 Compare Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Order para. 2 (defining the
standard by saying "[in order to find that a merger is in the
public interest, we must, for example, be convinced that it
will enhance competition") (emphasis added) with In Re Appli-
cation of Pacific Telesis Group and SBC Communications,
Inc. for Consent to Transfer Control of Pacific Telesis Group
and Its Subsidiaries, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC
Rcd. 2624, para. 2 (1997) (defining the standard by saying
"[a] demonstration that benefits will arise from the transfer
is not, however, a prerequisite to our approval, provided that
no foreseeable adverse consequences will result from the
transfer") (emphasis added) [hereinafter SBC/Pactel Order].
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The recent merger frenzy in many American in-
dustries9 illustrates Judge Bork's paradox of com-
petition - "although firms compete to win, the ulti-
mate victory is monopoly."'' 0 This is particularly
true in telecommunications markets where the
1996 Act has been answered with increased con-
solidation. 1 In fact, former FCC Chairman Reed
Hundt thought it natural that in the transition
from a monopoly environment to a competitive
environment, telecommunications mergers would
increase because they would allow firms to enter
new markets12 cheaper and faster than de novo en-
try.
The FCC is caught in the throes of a conflict.
While the Commission has been handed a Con-
gressional mandate to increase competition in the
telecommunications industry, the industry is rou-
tinely asking for FCC approval of mergers that, by
their very nature, decrease the number of com-
petitors in the communications sector.
The evolution of the FCC's public interest stan-
dard and its application to telecommunications
mergers documents the Commission's response
to this conflict and the arrival of the "pro-compet-
itive merger."'' These pro-competitive mergers
make FCC approval of the merger contingent
upon certain conditions designed to enhance
competition in the affected market(s). They also
illustrate the Commission's ability to go beyond
traditional antitrust law to promote competi-
9 See Ian Simpson, Fear and Wonder Drive Record U.S. Merger
Wave (visited on October 17, 1997) <http://biz.yahoo.com/
finance>. Simpson reported that as of mid-October of 1997,
U.S. mergers and acquisitions totaled $706.7 billion, topping
the 1996 full year record of $649.6 billion. Id. As of mid
October of 1997, 18 of those mergers were worth more than
$5 billion, above the 1995 full year record of 15. Id.
10 FCC Chairman Reed Hundt, The Hard Road Ahead-An
Agenda For the FCC in 1997 (December 26, 1996).
11 See FCC Chairman Reed Hundt, Address at the Mu-
seum of Television and Radio (June 3, 1997). Industry ana-
lysts and business reporters have written extensively about
the post-Act telecommunications merger trend. See generally
Frances Cairncross, A Survey of Telecommunications, ECONO-
MIST, September 13-19, 1997 (a separately paginated insert)
(surveying the difficulties in creating telecommunications
competition). See generally Allan Sloan, The Lost World, NEws-
WEEK, June 9, 1997, at 52 (observing "the new telecommuni-
cations world is sure starting to look a lot like the old tele-
communications world, full of giant companies about as
eager to compete with each other as pay-phone operators are
to refund your quarter when your call gets messed up. In-
stead of competing, the giants are combining by buying each
other").
12 See FCC Chairman Reed Hundt, Thinking About Why
Some Communications Mergers are Unthinkable, Address at the
Brookings Institution (June 19, 1997).
tion. 14
Pursuant to former Section 221 (a) of the Com,
munications Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"), the FCC
could approve the merger and acquisition of tele-
phone companies even if it would violate antitrust
laws.- The Commission had the prerogative to
approve or disapprove the merger based solely on
"public interest" concerns.' 6 The purpose of Sec-
tion 221(a) of the 1934 Act was to allow compet-
ing local phone companies to merge without anti-
trust scrutiny.' 7  The Commission was simply
asked to determine if such a merger was in the
public interest, or more specifically, in the inter-
est of the customers being served by the two com-
panies. 8 As the House Senate Conference Re-
port of the 1996 Act notes, "[i]n a world of
regulated monopolies, this idea made sense."19
In the 1996 Act, Congress repealed Section
221(a) because it could inadvertently undermine
the 1996 Act's goal of enhanced competition in at
least two ways. 2° First, the term "telephone com-
pany" was not defined. 2' Given the level of con-
vergence in the communications sector many
companies would try to argue that they were tele-
phone companies to gain exemption from anti-
trust scrutiny.22 Second, if Section 221(a) were
preserved, mergers between competing telephone
companies would go forward without antitrust re-
view, creating an anti-competitive environment. 23
The 1996 Act revoked the Commission's ability to
13 See Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 19985,
para. 2.
14 See id. paras. 178-9.
15 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 352, 48 Stat. 1064
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 221(a)) (1994).
16 See Douglas B. McFadden, Antitrust and Communica-
tions: Changes After the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 49 FED.
COMM. L.J. 457, 460-461 (1997).
17 See S. Conf. Rep. No. 104-230, at 200-1 (1996), reprinted
in P&F, The Telecommunications Act of 1996 Law and Legis-





22 See id. Specifically, Section 221 (a) would likely be
used to gain antitrust exemptions for the cable/telco buyout
provisions of the 1996 Act. Id. Any cable company owning
any telephone assets being bought out by a Bell Operating
Company ("BOC") would ask for antitrust immunity under
this section. Id.
23 See id. The legislative history also speculates that by
returning review of a competitive industry to the Department
of Justice ("DOJ") it would get both the FCC and the DOJ
back to their proper roles and end "government by consent
decree." Id. The relationship between the FCC and the DOJ
has been tense at times. Conflicts would arise when FCC.li-
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confer antitrust immunity. Nevertheless, the
Commission continued to conduct an industry-
specific analysis of mergers and their impact on
competition. The FCC's authority to do so is
rooted in the legislative mandate requiring the
FCC to act in the public interest.24
The FCC's approval of the high profile Bell At-
lantic/NYNEX merger 25created a new framework
for approving telecommunications mergers and
applied it to the merger of neighboring Regional
Bell Operating Companies ("RBOC"s). 26 The
Commission used this same framework to approve
the failed British Telecom ("BT") merger with
MCI. Though the terms and factors involved in
both merger approvals were different, together
they provide a new paradigm for FCC merger ap-
proval. Both mergers exemplify the FCC's new
public interest test for telecommunications merg-
ers in the post-1996 Act era.
In Section I, this Note will examine the history
of the FCC's public interest standard and its in-
herent difficulties. Section I also explains how
the Commission has interpreted the public inter-
est standard in scrutinizing telecommunications
mergers in the past. Section II focuses on three
case studies-the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX merger
and the failed SBC/AT&T and BT/MCI mergers.
Section III concludes with an assessment of the fu-
ture of the FCC's public interest standard and
whether it has been served by the Commission's
decisions. Section III also offers potential merger
applicants suggestions for ensuring the FCC's
public interest standard is met.
censing and regulation would conflict with the DOJ's inter-
pretation of antitrust laws or the First Amendment, for exam-
ple, See Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive:
What Makes an Independent Agency Independent?, 15 Cardozo L.
Rev. 273, 299 (1993).
24 See Bell Atlantic/Nynex Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 19985, para
2. The order states that "the public interest standard neces-
sarily subsumes and extends beyond the traditional parame-
ters of review under the antitrust laws." Id.
25 See Mike Mills, Bell Atlantic, NYNEX Reach Merger Accord
With FCC, WASti. POST, July 20, 1997, at Al.
26 The RBOCs were created to consolidate AT&T's 22
Bell Operating Companies ("BOCs") after the 1984 AT&T di-
vestiture. See United States v. American Telephone & Tele-
graph Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affd sub. nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
27 United States Department of Commerce, National
Telecommunications and Information Administration for
the Advisory Committee on the Public Interest Obligations of
Digital Television Broadcasters, A Primer on the Public Inter-
est Obligations of Television Broadcasters, Oct. 22, 1997, at
16 (on file with CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS) [hereinafter Primer
of Public Interest Obligations].
The public interest standard was originally in-
tended as the Federal Radio Commission's
("FRC") guiding principle for the allocation of
broadcast licenses.27 In the field of broadcast reg-
ulation, the FCC has enjoyed "ample leeway" in
deciding the public interest obligations of both
commercial and non-commercial broadcasters. 28
Such public interest obligations have included the
requirement that communications entities en-
courage the coverage of local public issues, allow
opportunities for local self-expression, offer a
minimum amount of children's and educational
programming and include political broadcasts. 29
The exact nature of the public interest standard
seems to hinge on balancing competing eco-
nomic, technological, political and social values .30
The public interest standard, however, is not with-
out its limits. Its use must be limited to advance a
legitimate communications policy objective. 31
In the absence of ideological hegemony, debate
over the FCC's public interest standard and its
boundaries will likely continue. One legal
scholar, for example, has attacked the standard as
"a derangement of constitutional structure," man-
dating the Commission to act according to its ver-
sion of the public interest.32 This delegation of
power arguably gives the FCC all the power a gov-
ernment can possibly posses. 33 Other legal schol-
ars have challenged whether the public interest
standard allows the FCC to assume additional re-
sponsibilities.34 While these arguments focus on
the nature of the Commission's authority, the
1996 Act clearly gave the Commission a new pol-
28 Id. (citing FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting, 309 U.S. 134
at 138 (1940) where the Court viewed the public interest as a
"supple instrument for the exercise of discretion by the ex-
pert body which Congress has charged to carry out its legisla-
tive policy.").
29 See Erwin G. Krasnow, The "Public Interest" Standard:
The Elusive Search for the Holy Grail, Oct. 22, 1997, (on file
with COMMLAw CONSPECTUS) [hereinafter The Public Interest
Standard], at 13-4.
30 See id. at 2.
31 See, e.g., NAACP v. Federal Power Commission, 425
U.S. 662, 670 and n. 7 (1976) (explaining that the FCC may
regulate equal employment opportunity practices in the
communications sector as part of its public interest consider-
ations because the diversity objective is part of the Communi-
cations Act, in contrast to the former Federal Power Commis-
sion which was not allowed to regulate such practices because
such regulation would not further any Federal Power Com-
mission objective).
3'2 William T. Mayton, The Illegitimacy of the Public Interest
Standard at the FCC, 38 EMORY L.J. 715, 715 (1989).
3-9 See id.
34 See Robert L. Pacholski, The FCC and Reciprocity: An Ex-
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icy directive - promote competition in the com-
munications sector.35  The Commission, in re-
sponse to this mandate, has used the public
interest standard as a tool to reach this goal. At-
torney Ronald Alan Wiener and Professor William
H. Read have argued that this policy directive
could be more easily realized if Congress explic-
itly amended the 1934 Act's public interest stan-
dard to include pro-competitive antitrust princi-
ples. 3 6 This pro-competitive public interest
standard would apply not only to telecommunica-
tions mergers but to all FCC regulation.37 While
Wiener and Read argue that Congress should
have made this amendment explicit, the FCC has
applied a public interest test designed to increase
competition when considering mergers without
this explicit redrafting. 3 By retaining the Com-
mission's flexible public interest standard 39 Con-
gress provided the FCC with yet another tool to
foster competition.
II. THE PUBLIC INTEREST BECOMES PRO-
COMPETITIVE
A. Judicial Review of FCC Public Interest and
Competition Determinations
Since the early 1950's the Supreme Court has
recognized that the Commission's mandate to act
in the public interest was a broad policy that did
not lend itself to exactitude. 40 In FCC v. RCA, the
amination of the "Public Interest" Standard, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 319,
344 (1983).
35 See 47 U.S.C.A §151 (1996).
36 Specifically, the amended section would read
"[c]ompetition in communications best serves the national
interest. Therefore the Federal Communications Commis-
sion shall act in the public interest, convenience and neces-
sity with respect to radio frequency licenses, and in the public
interest, convenience and necessity with respect to wireline
common carriers by refraining from regulation where such
regulation impedes competition. Competition shall be de-
fined in accordance with the principles of federal antitrust
law." William H. Read & Ronald Alan Weiner, FCC Reform:
Governing Requires a New Standard, 49:2 FED. COMM. L.J. 289,
321 (1997).
37 See id.
38 See Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 19985,
para. 2.
39 See Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. at 138 (1940).
40 See FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 90
(1953).
41 See id.
42 See id. at 86.
4- See id. at 98.
44 See Symposium: The Independence of Independent
Court upheld an FCC decision that authorized a
radiotelegraph company to open two new cir-
cuits41 in competition with a company that al-
ready operated in those markets. 42 Regarding the
appropriate level of competition in the communi-
cations sector the Court noted that "what compe-
tition is and should be in such areas must be read
in the light of the special considerations that have
influenced Congress to make specific provision
for the particular industry." 43 The Court, while
admitting that the public interest standard is mal-
leable, reminded the FCC that it acted at the will
of Congress when determining what level of com-
petition was necessary for the communications in-
dustry.4 4
More recently, there is precedent for the FCC's
public interest standard to be interpreted broadly
and include the special considerations of the com-
munications industry.45 In U.S. v. FCC, the D.C.
Circuit reviewed what it described as the most re-
cent stage of the FCC's nurturing of a "dynamic
new medium: domestic satellite communica-
tion."46 The FCC order under review granted a
satellite company the authority to construct new
domestic satellites and operate channels of com-
munication over the new system as a common car-
rier.47 This company's entry into the satellite in-
dustry provided increased capacity in a highly
concentrated field. 48 The court said that it was
not the FCC's principal responsibility to create
Agencies: 'Political' Influence at the FCC, 1988 DUKE L.J. 280
(1988) (stating that "while public discussion of agency 'inde-
pendence' usually focuses on allegations of improper White
House influence, the most powerful and persistent 'political'
influence over the Commission clearly originates with the
congressional appropriations and oversight committees and
with other important members of the legislature"). Id. at
282. If the Act becomes a political liability, pressure from
Capitol Hill will likely be felt on the issue of telecommunica-
tions mergers. Kirk Victor, Call Waiting, NATIONAL JOURNAL,
Jan. 31, 1998, at 234.
Senator Pressler's (R-SD, Chairman of the Commerce, Sci-
ence and Trasportation Committee) pollster reported that
the telco issue cost him 5 to 6 percent of the vote that led to
his narrow defeat (the only incumbent Senator to lose in
1996). Id. Senator Hollings (D-SC) challenged the nomina-
tion ofJoel Klein as antitrust chief at the DOJ because Klein
gave unconditional approval to the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX
merger. Id. Senator Wyden (D-OR) has encouraged the
Clinton administration to "dust off the antitrust laws". Id.
45 See United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 88 (1980).
46 Id. at 74.
47 See id.
48 See id. at 75.
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the maximum competitive environment possible,
but to act in the public interest.49 The court un-
derstood, however, that an expert agency could
not be expected to make perfect predictions con-
cerning the future of the communications mar-
ket.50 The Commission would be expected to use
its,.expertise to forecast where the public interest
lies in the future.51
In the pre-1996 Act environment, the positive
attributes of competition in the communications
sector were not universally accepted. With the
passage of the 1996 Act, the Commission has
taken the hint from Capitol Hill that additional
competition in the communications sector is 'sy-
nonymous with the pubic interest. As discussed
below, the Commission has historically consid-
ered the competitive impact of its decisions as
part of its public interest determination.
B. The FCC Applies an Increasingly Pro-
Competitive Public Interest Standard
1. FCC Decisions on Telecommunications
Competition
A number of pre-1996 Act decisions illustrate
the FCC's gradual movement toward promoting
competition. One of the Commission's seminal
pre-AT&T divestiture decisions addressed cus-
tomer premises equipment ("CPE"). 52 In
Carterfone, the FCC found tariff restrictions
prohibiting installation of CPE that was not harm-
ful to the public network as unlawful and against
the public interest.53 By granting competitors ac-
cess to the network, Carterfone's public interest de-
termination was a major step in the direction of
telecommunications competition. In 1974, in an-
other step toward competition, the Commission
examined competitive issues between existing car-
49 See id. at 104.
50 See id.
51 See id.
52 CPE includes any customer supplied terminal equip-
ment that is located on the customer's premise and intercon-
nects with the network.
53 See Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone
Service, 13 FCC 2d 420, 423 (1968); recon. 14 FCC 2d 571
(1968).
54 See In re App'n of AT&T For Auth. Under Sec. 214(a)
of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, To Supple-
ment Existing Facilities Between Boston, Mass., Memorandum
Opinion & Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 501, para. 17 (1974). See Spe-
cialized Common Carrier Services Order, 29 F.C.C.2d 870, recon.
denied in Memorandum Opinion and Order, 31 F.C.C.2d 1106,
riers and new entrants in providing point-to-point
services, such as long distance, over microwave fa-
cilities.54 The Commission concluded that private
line carriers should be able to compete fully and
fairly without any protective measures for new en-
trants that cannot survive on their own merits.5 5
The Commission clearly stated that it was well
within its authority to consider the impact of its
decisions on competition as part of its public in-
terest analysis. 56 The Commission acted accord-
ingly by deciding that in certain private line inter-
city services competition would be in the public
interest.57
In another pro-competitive decision, the FCC
found an industry agreement giving AT&T com-
petitors a discount on access and interconnection
costs to be in the public interest.58 The "ENFIA"
decision was another pre-divestiture decision
where the public interest was satisfied by another
move toward telecommunications competition.
In a 1979 decision approving the merger of GTE
and Telenet, the FCC explicitly considered the
competitive consequences of its decision as part
of its public interest determination. The Commis-
sion stated that any remedial conditions imposed
on the merger were intended to advance four in-
terrelated goals: (i) to ensure that GTE/Telenet
would be an innovative and efficient competitor,
(ii) to protect ratepayers and competitors from
abuse, (iii) to ensure that once Telenet was a part
of GTE it would continue to serve the "public in-
terest" and (iv) to encourage competition.59
The Commission cited the above GTE/Telenet
analysis to support a "fulsome public interest anal-
yses" in its Bell Atlantic/NYNEX decision.60 This
same type of public interest analysis can also be
found in FCC decisions directly addressing the
BOCs. For example, in Computer II,61 the Coi-
affirmed sub. nom. Washington Util. & Transp. Comm. v. FCC,
513 F.2d 1142 (9a' Cir. 1975).
55 See id. para. 17. This competition was limited to pri-
vate line carriers until MCI v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir.
1978) where the D.C. Circuit opened all interstate services,
private line or ordinary long distance, to competition.
56 See id. para. 25.
57 See id.
58 See Exchange Network Facilities for Interstate Access
("ENFIA"), 71 FCC 2d 440, para. 48 (1979). The discount
was compensation for an inferior connection. Id.
59 See Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 19985, at
fn. 82.
60 See id. para. 35.
61 See Bell Operating Company Safeguards and Tier 1 Local
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mission found the public interest to require non-
structural safeguards to prevent cross-subsidiza-
tion by the BOCs in their enhanced services. 62
More recently, the Commission invoked the pub-
lic interest standard in requiring local exchange
carriers ("LECs") to permit competitive local ex-
change carriers ("CLECs") to connect their facili-
ties to the LECs' facilities to provide "expanded
interconnection."63
The preceding FCC decisions about telecom-
munications competition illustrate how competi-
tion gradually became more important for the
FCC. In the beginning, "public interest" seemed
to be no more than the magic words the Commis-
sion used to protect its decisions from reversal.
For decades, competition was only one of the
things on a long list of considerations that the
Commission considered. As the telecommunica-
tions industry developed, the Commission's pub-
lic interest analysis became a refined competitive
analysis implementing clear theories on how to
promote competition.
2. AT&T/McCaw and Emerging Communications
Technologies
In more high profile decisions, such as the
AT&T/McCaw merger, the Commission retained
these pro-competitive public interest principles.
The AT&T/McCaw merger created a significant
competitor to BOC-affiliated cellular operators by
giving AT&T a pivotal role in the future of cellular
telephony. 64 The applicants argued before the
Commission that their proposed merger would
help to foster the development of a competitive
communications network.65 Since the merger
united AT&T, the largest provider of long dis-
tance telephone service in the United States with
Exchange Company Safeguards, 6 FCC Rcd. 7571 (1991), vacated
in part and remanded, California v. FCC, 39 F.3d. 919 (9" Cir.
1994).
62 These are services that employ computer processing
applications and offer the subscriber different information
or involve the subscriber interacting with stored information
(voice mail for example).
63 Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone Company
Facilities, 9 FCC Rcd. 5154 (1994); vacated and remanded, Bell
Atlantic Co. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
64 See Erin M. Reilly, The Telecommunications Industry in
1993: The Year of The Merger, 2 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 95, 103
(1994).
65 In re Applications of McCaw and AT&T, for Consent to
the Transfer of Control of McCaw Cellular Communications,
Inc. and its Subsidiaries, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9
McCaw, the nation's leading operator of conven-
tional local and regional cellular services, both
the DOJ and the FCC imposed conditions on the
merger. 66
The Commission was urged by parties who filed
comments on the merger to impose conditions
that would act as a check on McCaw's alleged bot-
tleneck cellular exchange and AT&T's market
power.6 7 The Commission concluded that the
"competitive component of [the] statutory public
interest standard" would be satisfied by imposing
two conditions:6 (i) that AT&T agree not to dis-
criminate in favor of McCaw and against other
competitors for cellular network equipment sold
to McCaw's competitors under existing contracts
and (ii) that AT&T/McCaw each take appropriate
steps to prevent third party data from falling into
the wrong hands.69
The Commission admitted in AT&T/McCaw
that the pro-competitive effects of a merger are as
important as the anti-competitive effects in mak-
ing its public interest determinations.7 0  The
AT&T/McCaw merger brought a stronger com-
petitor to the cellular industry by bringing to-
gether two companies with significant technologi-
cal capabilities. 71 As a result of the merger,
consumers in the cellular industry would have
more choices and benefit from more price com-
petition.7 2 The Commission's lofty conclusion
was that this merger would be "another significant
step in fostering the economic growth of our na-
tion, one that encourages AT&T's and McCaw's
investment in this nation's telecommunications
infrastructure... and has the potential of bringing
U.S. consumers increased access to new telecom-
munications services at lower prices. ' 73 It was the
combination of pro-competitive commitments
and the prospect of a new competitive market be-
FCC Rcd. 5836, para. I [hereinafter AT&T/McCaw Order].
Some have concluded that the AT&T/McCaw merger's great-
est significance was that it would increase competition in cel-
lular telephony and ideally, provide lower prices to the con-
sumer. See Reilly, supra note 64, at 103.
66 See AT&T/McCaw Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 5836, paras. 2,3
and 7.
67 See id. para. 20.
68 See id.
69 See id.
7 See id. para. 57.
71 See id.
72 See id. Furthermore, it was thought that the cellular
interexchange market for mobile customers would benefit
from AT&T/McCaw's equal access commitments. See id.
73 Id. para. 60.
[VoL 6
Thinkable Mergers
ing further developed that led the FCC to ap-
prove the AT&T/McCaw merger.
3. SBC/Pacific Telesis Group - An RBOC Marriage
of a Different Sort
Immediately following passage of the 1996 Act,
the Texas based RBOC, SBC, set out to consume
the California based RBOC, Pacific Telesis Group
("Pactel"). SBC's buyout of Pactel was the first
Bell acquisition of another Bell.7 4 In 1990, SBC
joined with France Telecom and Grupo Carso to
purchase 20.4 percent of Telefonos de Mexico
(Telmex) .75 SBC's purchase of PactTel would
give it control over local phone lines in California
and Nevada. Since more than half of all phone
calls made to Mexico from the United States
originated in either California or Texas, SBC
would stand to benefit from profitable U.S.-Mex-
ico traffic once they were allowed into the long
distance market.7
6
It may be ironic that the SBC/Pactel merger
would be approved in an environment of suppos-
edly heightened competition. SBC and Pactel did
not, however, share contiguous local access trans-
port areas,77 ("LATAs") nor was there any indica-
tion that SBC and Pactel would directly compete
with each other, as was the case in Bell Atlantic/
NYNEX, making the competitive issues less con-
troversial. The Commission set forth its standard
for merger review by stating that "a demonstra-
tion that benefits will arise from the transfer is
not, however, a prerequisite to our approval, pro-
vided that no foreseeable adverse consequences
will result from the transfer. 7 As discussed be-
low, this was a far less exacting standard than was
required in the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX merger.
While the public interest was not specifically in-
voked in the SBC/Pactel Order, the applications
were made pursuant to section 310(d) of the
74 See Mike Mills, The Bells' Fastest Operator, WASH. POST,
Jan. 6, 1998, at DI.
75 See id. at D4.
76 See id.
77 LATAs include all points served by any particular BOC
within an existing community. During divestiture, LATA
boundaries determined the allocations of assets and liabili-
ties between the BOCs and AT&T.
78 SBCIPacTel Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 2624 (1997), para. 2.
79 47 U.S.C. §310(d) (1996).
80 See SBC/PacTel Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 2624 (1997), para.
17.
81 See id. para. 18.
82 See id. para. 23.
Communications Act which specifically requires
that any proposed transfer of licenses must serve
"the public interest, convenience and necessity. ' 79
Accordingly, the Commission applied the anti-
trust doctrine of actual potential competition.
The doctrine applies when a firm proposes to
enter a market by merging with a firm that is al-
ready operating in that market "and, but for the
merger," the firm would have entered that market
in a way that would have reduced concentration.80
The doctrine has five elements: (i) the target mar-
ket is, in fact, concentrated, (ii) few other poten-
tial entrants to the market are "equivalent" to the
company seeking to enter by way of the merger,
(iii) the company seeking entry by merger would
have sought entry by other means but for the pro-
posed merger, (iv) the firm had other means of
entering the concentrated market and (v) the al-
ternative means of entry would produce a great
likelihood of a more competitive environment."'
The Commission concluded that the doctrine of
potential actual competition was not satisfied by
the parties opposing SBC's acquisition of
PacTel. 82 Since there were many other potential
entrants that were functionally equivalent or
stronger than SBC, and there was no indication
that SBC would have sought entry by other means
but for the proposed merger, the doctrine was
held inapplicable.85
In the SBC/PacTel Order the Commission also
considered, among other things, allegations of
SBC's past anti-competitive behavior.84 The FCC
noted that SBC's conduct, while designed to delay
and minimize local telephone competition in
Texas, did not violate the law.8 5 The Commission
concluded with the notion that the best preven-
tion of anti-competitive conduct is found in the
stimulation of effective competition.8 6
As the Commission was preparing to create this
competitive stimulus by implementing the 1996
83 See id. paras. 23-8.
84 SBC's anti-competitive practices have been com-
plained of elsewhere. See generally Frances Cairncross, A Sur-
vey of Telecommunications, ECONOMIST, September 13-19, 1997
at 56:15 (presenting MCI's, an authorized local competitor,
complaint that when they ask SBC for information about lo-
cal telephone services offered to certain customers, so they
can offer something better, SBC calls those customers to
plant "seeds of doubt in [their] minds about MCI's ability to
provide local services"). .
85 See SBC/PacTel Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 2624 (1997), paras.
37-8.
86 See id. para. 38.
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Act, it also considered any impediments the
merger would pose to achieving the Act's goals.
The FCC concluded that, despite the contentions
of the parties opposing the merger, the merger
would not inhibit SBC's compliance with any of
the Act's provisions.8 7 The Commission did warn,
however, that the approval of this merger should
not be taken to mean that in the post-Act era all
proposed mergers of major carriers will be ap-
proved. 8 As discussed below, it meant it.
III. A NEW PUBLIC INTEREST STANDARD
FOR THE COMPETITIVE AGE
A. Bell Atlantic/NYNEX - Making A Merger
Pro-Competitive
[T]he Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Merger Order represents
new thinking in how the FCC will evaluate telecommu-
nications mergers.8 9
The $23.7 billion merger of Bell Atlantic and
NYNEX, each with 13 million telecommunica-
tions customers, formed a telephone company
that dominated local exchange service from
Maine to Virginia, 90 a region that accounts for ap-
proximately 25% of the population of the United
States and a third of all domestic long distance
phone traffic. 91 The merger created a communi-
cations company second in size only to AT&T. 92
The DOJ completed its review of the proposed
Bell Atlantic/NYNEX merger without taking any
action on the antitrust issues presented. 93 While
antitrust chief Joel Klein concluded that Bell At-
lantic and NYNEX were not direct competitors,94
the FCC found that Bell Atlantic did have plans to
enter NYNEX's LATA 13295 and therefore should
be considered a direct potential competitor to
NYNEX. 96 It was the FCC's conclusion that Bell
Atlantic and NYNEX were, in fact, actual competi-
87 See id. para. 32.
88 See id. para. 33.
89 Separate Statement of Commissioner James H.
Quello, In re Application of NYNEX and Bell Atlantic for Con-
sent to Transfer Control of NYNEX Corporation and Its Sub-
sidiaries, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 19985,
20124 (1997).
90 See Mills, supra note 74.
91 See id.
92 See id.
93 See Klein Criticized From Both Directions, Vol. 17 COMM.
DAiLy No. 215, Nov. 6, 1997. Judiciary Committee Chairman
Hyde (R-IL) had "no opinion" on DOJ's antitrust position
while senior committee Democrat Conyers (D-MI) called the
DOJ's application of antitrust laws "weak... puny." Id.
94 See id.
tors that led the Commission to formulate nar-
rowly tailored industry specific conditions on the
proposed merger.
Without agreeing to these conditions, the Com-
mission found that the applicants would not have
been able to meet their burden of proving not
merely that the merger would produce no adverse
competitive consequences, but that it would actu-
ally enhance competition.97 Indeed, but for the
conditions, the merger would have reduced com-
petition. This new standard of review was antici-
pated by then Chairman Reed Hundt's address at
the Museum of Radio and Television in New York
City. Hundt explained that government has to be
"extremely cautious and wary" in approving pro-
posed mergers that involve markets previously
closed to competitors. 98
1. A Conditional Merger
At the time of the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX merger
the pro-competitive rules to facilitate local tele-
phone competition were still being written. With
local competition not yet a reality, the Commis-
sion concluded that only with certain conditions
attached would the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX union
enhance competition. 99 The FCC admitted that
the conditions to be imposed on the Bell Atlan-
tic/NYNEX merger would not solve the anti-com-
petitive issues raised by all proposed telecommu-
nications mergers.100 Yet, their importance to
FCC approval of the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX merger
cannot be overstated. Commissioner Ness stated
that she was "voting to approve this consolidation
only because I believe that the conditions we have
placed on the merger are ones that, as applied
across the combined region, more than compen-
sate for the loss of potential competition between
95 LATA 132 encompasses New York City, Long Island
and portions of West Chester County. See Bell Atlantic/
NYNEX Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 19985, para. 8.
96 See id. See, e.g., Sloan, supra note 11, at 53 (reporting
.. you can expand quicker by buying than by building.
Take Bell Atlantic ... [i]nstead of competing with neighbor-
ing NYNEX, which is arguably the most vulnerable Baby Bell
because of its high prices and crummy service, Bell Atlantic is
buying it.").
97 See Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 19985,
para. 2.
98 FCC Chairman Reed Hundt, Address at The Museum
of Television and Radio Uune 3, 1997).
99 See Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 19985,
para. 178.
101) See id. para. 179.
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Bell Atlantic and NYNEX" (emphasis added).101
Commissioner Quello remarked in his separate
statement that the conditions imposed on the
merger "underscore the Commission's unique
role in reviewing telecommunications mergers
pursuant to the public interest test in the Commu-
nications Act."102 The Commissioners' comments
emphasize the importance of the conditioned
merger. Certain telecommunications mergers
necessarily diminish competition. Rather than re-
ject the applicants, the Commission resolved to
impose pro-competitive conditions, particularly in
local markets, in an effort to offset any anti-com-
petitive consequences of approving the merger.
The conditions imposed on the Bell Atlantic/
NYNEX merger illuminate the major competitive
issues considered by the FCC as it reviews tele-
communications mergers and offer one method
of addressing public interest concerns. One of
the conditions imposed upon the merger was the
requirement that Bell Atlantic/NYNEX produce
performance monitoring reports so CLECs could
determine whether they were receiving nondis-
criminatory operational support system103
("OSS") access.' 0 4 Performance monitoring re-
ports were found to be a helpful tool toward en-
suring competition because they offer competi-
tors enforceable standards to ensure
nondiscriminatory access to the incumbent local
exchange carrier's network ("ILEC"). 105 The per-
formance reports would cover OSS access relating
to the provision of unbundled network elements
("UNEs") as well as interconnection and resold
services.106
Another major condition placed on the Bell At-
lantic/NYNEX merger concerned the pricing
methodology the new entity would employ when
selling UNEs to carriers seeking interconnection.
101 Press Statement of Commissioner Susan Ness on Bell
Atlantic/NYNEX Merger, (Aug. 14, 1997) (on file with COM-
MLAw CONSPECrus).
102 Separate Statement of Commissioner James H.
Quello, In re Application of NYNEX and Bell Atlantic for Con-
sent to Transfer Control of NYNEX Corporation and Its Sub-
sidiaries, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 19985,
20124 (1997).
103 OSS functions include pre-ordering, ordering, provi-
sioning, billing and maintenance and repair. See Bell Atlan-
tic/NYNEX Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 19985, para. 182.
104 See id. para. 193.
105 See id. paras. 193-4.
106 See id. para. 182.
107 See id. para. 200. But cf Iowa Util. Bd. v. FCC, 135
F.3d 543 (8"h Cir. 1998) (holding that the FCC could not im-
The Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Order stipulated that
these resale rates be based on forward looking
costs.' 0 7 The Commission concluded that the for-
ward looking cost requirement allowed CLECs to
make informed investment decisions based on
costs that reflect the market accurately.108 The
Commission intended that CLECs benefit from
the same economies of scale and scope as the new
Bell Atlantic/NYNEX.' 0 9
The Bell Atlantic/NYNEX merger was also sub-
ject to review by state regulators. Former FCC
Chairman Hundt, in his remarks to state commis-
sioners on the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX merger, said
that he hoped states would consider the tech-
nique the FCC used in approving the merger by
imposing pro-competitive commitments to offset
the anti-competitive effects that it could otherwise
produce. 10 Concerning the specific pricing pro-
visions the FCC required, Hundt emphasized that
it was important for all the state commissions to
agree on a pricing methodology for interconnec-
tion."' He reminded the state commissioners
that without a competition policy that was "na-
tional in scope," local competition would remain
elusive. 112 Hundt defended the Commission's im-
position of forward looking costs on the merger
by arguing that such a methodology would con-
strain the ability of an ILEC to prevent competi-
tion by setting prices beyond the cost of providing
the service. 113 Furthermore, Hundt hoped that
this pricing methodology would encourage new
competitors to invest in facilities where it would
be efficient to do so. 1 4
Hundt encouraged the state commissioners af-
fected by the merger to meet with each other and
federal regulators to discuss the pricing and other
merger related issues. 115 Despite these calls for
cooperation, the pricing condition turned out to
pose a pricing scheme for local competition provisions of the
Telecommunications Act).
108 See id. at 200.
109 See generally id.
110 See FCC Chairman Reed Hundt, Remarks to State
Commissioners on the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Merger in Phila-






115 See id. It should be noted that the FCC conditions
imposed on Bell Atlantic/NYNEX did not preclude state
commissions from imposing any additional requirements in
their own proceedings. See Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Order, 12
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be a controversial one. By November, AT&T ac-
cused Bell Atlantic of breaking its merger
promises.116 In a formal complaint to the FCC,
AT&T alleged that Bell Atlantic/NYNEX was not
pricing unbundled elements using the forward
looking costs method.1 17 This was the first formal
complaint made since approval of the merger .118
The conditions placed on the Bell Atlantic/
NYNEX merger approval will likely be grist for fu-
ture debate as interested parties and the courts
determine the exact terms of the conditions and
their legal ramifications.
It is clear, however, that but for the merger,
Bell Atlantic would have entered and improved
competition in New York City somewhat. The
conditions imposed on the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX
merger were designed to make it easier for one of
the other CLECs to grow faster than it otherwise
would and thus improve competition as much as
Bell Atlantic would have had it entered. While ap-
proval of the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX merger was
still pending and the above conditions were still
being formulated, Hundt made it clear that the
imposition of pro-competitive conditions will not
be enough to gain approval of every proposed
merger the Commission is asked to review.
2. SBC and AT&T - Testing the Limits of Merger
Approval
In Hundt's address to state commissioners in
early June of 1997, the chairman mentioned that
"[g] overnment should also be aware that if it fails
FCC Rcd. 19985, para. 181.
In fact, the New York Public Utilities Commission later as-
serted jurisdiction and numerous conditions. See Proceeding
on Motion of the Commission as to the Joint Petition of New
York Telephone Company, NYNEX Corporation, and Bell At-
lantic Corporation for a Declaratory Ruling That the Com-
mission Lacks Jurisdiction to Investigate and Approve a Pro-
posed Merger Between NYNEX and a Subsidiary of Bell
Atlantic or, in the Alternative, for Approval of the Merger.
176 P.U.R. 4 th 474.
116 See AT&T Accuses Bell Atlantic of Ignoring Promises Made
to Win Merger Approval, Vol. 17 COMM. DAILY No. 215, Nov. 6,
1997.
117 See id. See generally Iowa Utilities Bd. V. FCC, 120 F.3d
753, 794, 819 (81h Cir. 1997) (vacating the FCC's interconnec-
tion order, and specifically its pricing rules, as exceeding the
FCC's authority).
118 See id.
119 Hundt, Address at the Museum of Television and Ra-
dio, supra note 98.
120 See id.
121 See Hundt, Address at the Brookings Institute, supra
note 12.
to develop clear and predictable guidelines, it will
send a message of tolerance to those firms that
wish to test the limits of merger policy in newly
opened or changing markets." 119 Hundt hoped
that once merger limits were in place, firms would
spend less time developing merger strategies and
more time thinking about how to compete effec-
tively. 120 Before the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX merger
approval was completed and officially released to
the public, Hundt was offered an opportunity to
set some limits on the mergers that the Commis-
sion would accept.
In Hundt's widely reported address to the
Brookings Institute, the third speech Hundt made
on telecommunications mergers in the summer of
1997, the chairman declared that an AT&T/
RBOC merger would be "unthinkable." 121
Hundt's statement received a significant amount
of press coverage because it is virtually unheard of
for the head of a regulatory body to publicly make
a judgment on a merger before it is officially pro-
posed.' 22 While Hundt's assertion was a break
with the norm, he later told reporters that he was
merely responding to former AT&T chairman
Robert Allen's invitation to discuss hypothetical
AT&T/RBOC mergers.1 23
In his address Hundt invoked the Commission's
statutory authority under Sections 214124 and
310125 of the Communications Act as obligating
the FCC to approve or disapprove telecommuni-
cations mergers.1 26  Hundt explained that an
AT&T/RBOC merger would not gain Commis-
sion approval because they were precluded com-
122 See Mark Landler, In Unusual Move, F C.C. Chief Criti-
cizes a Possible Deal, N.Y. TIMES, July, 19, 1997, at DI.
123 See Hundt Deems AT&T-SBC Merger 'Unthinkable', Vol.
17 COMM. DAILY No. 119, June 20, 1997.
124 Section 214 commands no carrier to undertake the
extension of lines "unless and until there shall first have been
obtained from the Commission a certificate that the present or
future public convenience and necessity require or will require the
construction, or operation, or construction and operation, of
such additional or extended line." (emphasis added). 47
U.S.C. §214 (1994).
125 Section 310 holds, in relevant part, that "[n]o con-
struction permit or station license, or any rights thereunder,
shall be transferred, assigned, or disposed of in any manner,
voluntarily or involuntarily, directly or indirectly, or by trans-
fer of control of any corporation holding such permit or li-
cense, to any person except upon application to the Commis-
sion and upon finding by the Commission that the public
interest, convenience, and necessity will be served thereby. " 47
U.S.C. §310(d) (1994) (emphasis added).
126 See Hundt, Address at the Brookings Institution, supra
note 12. Note that both of the sections Hundt cited mandate
the Commission to act in the public interest.
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petitors - firms that would compete with each
other in the absence of laws or other anti-compet-
itive rules precluding them from competition1127
Hundt pointed out that such a merger would be
considered and evaluated by the Commission as a
horizontal merger. 128 Hundt anticipated the ar-
gument that the level of convergence and techno-
logical change justifies mergers of this sort and
declared "the presence of technological change
and innovation does not mean that proposed com-
binations of precluded competitors are now
'thinkable'." 12 9 After surveying the presence of
AT&T in the long distance market and RBOCs' in
the local market, Hundt concluded that an
AT&T/RBOC merger would be unable to meet
the pro-competitive standard 130 later set out ex-
plicitly in the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX order, regard-
less of the conditions placed on a merger between
them.
Hundt concluded his trilogy of speeches on
telecommunications mergers by focusing on the
Commission's limits on the telecommunications
mergers it would approve. To make such a clear
pronouncement while another major merger was
still under review clearly broke with government
agency practice.1 3 1 The summer of 1997, how-
ever, was hardly normal for the Commission.
Shortly after setting out a framework in the Bell
Atlantic/NYNEX order for approving telecommu-
nications mergers, the FCC applied that frame-
work to a vertical merger.
127 See id. Hundt thought the term "precluded competi-
tors" was more useful than the traditional "potential competi-
tors" when the law, or the lack of pro-competitive rules,
rather than inclination or capability, was the reason that two
firms have not become actual competitors. Id.
128 See id. Hundt explained a horizontal merger as typi-
cally involving "combinations of firms that operate -at the
same 'level' in an industry...sell[ing] the same or similar
products to the same customers. • See id. Hundt explained a
vertical merger as typically involving "two firms at different
levels in a distribution chain." See id. The chairman ex-
plained further that horizontal combinations "are often




131 See generally Landler, supra note 122 (reporting that
"these are extraordinary times in Washington, where the top
antitrust post at the Justice Department has gone unfilled for
months during a period of unprecedented consolidation in
the telecommunications industry.").
132 See Nick Louth, MCI Bidders Looking for 21" Century
Payback (visited on October 17, 1997) <http://
biz.yahoo.com/finance>.
133 See id.
3. BT/MCI - Applying the New Framework
MCI was uniquely positioned to receive bids
from BT and eventually from both GTE and
Worldcom. Financial analysts observed that the
long distance business, in general terms, was
threatened. 32 MCI, however, was well positioned
for the following changes in the information
economy: (i) the emergence of a marketplace on
the Internet, (ii) increased demand for data (pos-
sibly allowing packet-data systems, the Internet for
example, to dominate the voice- or circuit-
switched market) and (iii) the slowing of growth
in the demand for voice services (except in the
wireless industry) . 33 MCI was in step with these
larger economic trends with its high proportion
of business customers, a Systemhouse unit that
specialized in handling Internet consumers and
more Internet traffic than any other company in
the world.13 4 It was MCI's unique position in a
changing economy that led a chief telecommuni-
cations economist to remark, "[b]oth GTE and
Worldcom bids are, deep down, Internet plays for
the 21st century. ' 135
The BT/MCI deal, and subsequent merger ap-
proval process, differed from Bell Atlantic/
NYNEX in several respects. For example, BT/
MCI, unlike Bell Atlantic/NYNEX, had gone
through a similar approval process when they
sought FCC and DOJ approval in July of 1994 for
BT's initial 20% investment in MCI (this approval
134 See id.
135 See id. This observation was made by David Roddy,
chief telecommunications economist at Deloitte & Touche
Consulting Group in Atlanta. See id. The trend toward the
Internet, in the words of Robert Pepper, chief of the FCC's
Office of Plans and Policy, is the "collision of the circuit-
switched and the packet-switched worlds." Frances Cairn-
cross, A Survey of Telecommunications, ECONOMIST, September
13-19, 1997, (a separately paginated insert) at 25-6. The In-
ternet is quickly becoming a serious competitor to traditional
telephony and presents yet another convergence considera-
tion for the FCC when evaluating telecommunications merg-
ers. See id. The differences between the Internet and tradi-
tional telephony are not strictly technical either. Id. at 26.
The telephone business, for example, has traditionally been
highly regulated while the Internet has, for the most part,
been unregulated. See id.. Another big difference between
the two forms of communication is price. The successful
MCI bidder Worldcom, the fourth largest long distance car-
rier in the U.S., recently announced a fully commercial ser-
vice for all the international fax traffic they handle over the
Internet. See id. at 25. Worldcom's plan, for example, cuts
the cost of faxing between New York and London from ap-
proximately 30 cents to approximately 16-19 cents. See id.
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process was dubbed "BT/MCI I"). At that time,
the Commission found BT's investment to be in
accord with the foreign ownership caps set out in
Section 310 of the Communications Act.136 Dur-
ing BT/MCI I, the Commission made other posi-
tive public interest findings. In particular, the
Commission found BT's 20% investment in MCI
expanded MCI's ability to be an effective competi-
tor domestically and, in return, contribute to the
growth of the American economy generally. 137
During BT/MCI I, both the DOJ and FCC had
concerns about BT's ability to discriminate in
favor of MCI and to the detriment of other com-
peting U.S. carriers. 138 Accordingly, in BT/MCI
I, the DOJ imposed certain non-discriminatory
commitments on BT that they revised for the
1997 merger. 13 9 Although the DOJ recognized
that both the U.K. and the U.S. were working to-
ward a deregulatory telecommunications environ-
ment, the DOJ, pursuant to its antitrust obliga-
tions, found it necessary to modify the final
judgment from 1994 by (i) imposing stricter re-
porting requirements, (ii) prohibiting MCI or its
subsidiary Concert from using confidential infor-
mation that would be competitively useful and
(iii) extending the terms of the decree to the year
2004.140
The Commission's subsequent approval of the
failed 141 BT/MCI merger illustrates how the Bell
Atlantic/NYNEX framework was adopted to deal
with uncertainties in the future of international
telecommunications regulation. 14 2  The FCC's
regulation of international communications has,
136 In re The Merger of MCI Communications Corpora-
tion and British Telecommunications PLC, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 15351, para. 26 (1997) [here-
inafter BT/MCI Order].
137 See id.
138 See id. paras. 24, 26.
139 See id.
140 See id. para. 24.
141 MCI eventually accepted a bid to merge with
Worldcom, Inc. See generally WorldCom and MCI Win 'Over-
whelming' Shareowner Votes for $37-Billion Deal, Vol. 18 COMM.
DAILY No. 48, Mar. 12, 1998. A day after the announcement,
state attorney generals called the merger a threat to competi-
tion. See S.C., VA. Attorneys Gen. Call Merged MCI-Worldcom
Threat to Competition, Vol. 18 COMM. DAILY No. 49, Mar. 13,
1998.
142 The World Trade Organization's Basic Telecom
Agreement calls for open market entry for all member states
(both the U.S. and U.K. are member states) but would not be
enforced until January 1, 1998. BT/MCI Order, 12 FCC Rcd.
15351, para. 7. The FCC was particularly comfortable deal-
ing with the United Kingdom on deregulatory issues. Id. The
Commission observed that the "United Kingdom has been in
since the early 1980's, been concerned with the
principle of reciprocity - treating foreign common
carriers that want to operate domestically as U.S.
common carriers are treated by the regulatory
body in the home country. 143 Robert L. Pachol-
ski, in The FCC and Reciprocity: An Examination of
the Public Interest Standard, charged that the FCC,
under the public interest mandate of the 1934
Communications Act, had usurped U.S. trade pol-
icy from its proper forum.' 44  Furthermore,
Pacholski argued, there is nothing in the Commu-
nications Act of 1934 to indicate that Congress in-
tended the FCC to consider a policy matter as po-
litically sensitive as international trade
relations. 145
Pacholski would likely argue that the public in-
terest standard does not authorize the Commis-
sion to make some of the international trade de-
terminations it was asked to make in BT/MCI.
While the Commission considered the interna-
tional ramifications of the BT/MCI deal its focus
from the outset was that in evaluating the effects
of the proposed merger of BT and MCI, it would
employ "the same competitive framework" ap-
plied in the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX order. 1 46 The
Commission clarified that the Bell Atlantic/
NYNEX order should not be interpreted as mean-
ing that agreement to pro-competitive conditions
will always carry an applicant's burden of demon-
strating a merger is in the public interest.147 As
Hundt's SBC speech indicated, this would be par-
ticularly true given the size and economic power
of both applicants in the BT/MCI deal.
the forefront in adopting regulatory policies that seek to in-
troduce competition into all telecommunications markets."
Id. para. 16.
143 See Robert L. Pacholski, The FCC and Reciprocity: An
Examination of the "Public Interest" Standard, 62 TEX. L. REv.
319, 319 (1983)(citing In re French Tel. Cable Co., 71
F.C.C.2d 393, 403-04 (1979) (considering the French govern-
ment's licensing policies in deciding whether to grant French
petitioners a license). In more recent transactions this stan-
dard has been referred to as the "effective competitive oppor-
tunities" test ("ECO" test). See BT/MCI Order, 12 FCC Rcd.
15351, para. 212. The Commission first examines the ability
of U.S. common carriers to enter the foreign market and
then the conditions of entry are reviewed (this included com-
petitive safeguards, terms of interconnection, and overall reg-
ulatory framework). See id. para. 215. The Commission still
has the option of denying the license if public interest factors
warrant that result. See id.
144 See id. at 344.
145 See id.
146 See id. para. 9.
147 See id. para. 11.
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BT, as Great Britain's largest telecommunica-
tions operator, and MCI, as the second largest
long distance carrier in the U.S., were both con-
sidered to be significant suppliers in the U.S.-U.K.
international transport market. 148  While the
merger of these two entities would obviously in-
crease concentration in this market, the FCC 149
concluded there was reason to expect certain mit-
igating factors to reduce the impact of this con-
centration if BT/MCI acted anti-competitively. 150
These factors included (i) new transatlantic cables
that would increase the capacity and thus lessen
BT/MCI's share of capacity on the route and (ii)
adherence to a condition imposed by the Euro-
pean Commission ("EC") that the merged entity
sell some of its capacity.1 51
While the FCC's conclusions and predictions
about the international transport market indi-
cated that the proposed merger would not lessen
competition, pursuant to the standard of review
set out in Bell Atlantic/NYNEX, the applicants
had to prove the new BT/MCI entity would en-
hance competition.1 52 The Commission was con-
vinced that the merger could enhance competi-
tion in domestic local exchange markets by
strengthening MCI's financial and technical back-
ing.153 By strengthening MCI as a local exchange
market participant, the corresponding power of
ILECs would be reduced, thus hastening the
emergence of effective local competition.' 54
In the alternative, the Commission also consid-
ered whether the merger would eliminate BT as a
competitor in the domestic local exchange mar-
ket.155 The FCC found that BT lacked the specific
capabilities and incentives to be a major competi-
tor in the U.S. local exchange market without a
significant domestic partner.1 56 Therefore, its
148 See id. paras. 14, 19, 20. BT has 72% of the business
market and 88% of the residential market in Great Britain.
Frances Cairncross, A Survey of Telecommunications, ECONO-
MIST, Sept. 13-19, 1997, (a separately paginated insert) at 13.
149 Pursuant to United States v. FCC, as described above,
the regulatory body is required to survey market conditions
at that time and is not expected to make perfect predictions.
The Commission explicitly stated that "we are in the midst of
rapid regulatory and market changes". BT/MCI Order, 12
FCC Rcd. 15351, para. 38. The Commission recognized that
it had to evaluate the impact of the proposed merger not
only when the WTO agreement and 1996 Act are being im-
plemented but also after both have been fully implemented
and some of their goals realized (BOC entry into the in-
terlata market for example). See id.
150 See id. para. 14.
elimination from that market via the merger
would not significantly harm competition.
On the issue of local competition in the U.K.,
some commenters urged the FCC to condition its
merger approval on the introduction of equal ac-
cess in the U.K 157 Dialing parity and carrier pre-
selection, for example, were unavailable in the
U.K 158 The British government opposed such a
provision for fear that it would undermine its pol-
icy of encouraging facilities based competition. 159
The FCC concluded that MCI would benefit from
BT's presence in the local markets of the U.K.
Pursuant to the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX methodol-
ogy, the FCC imposed a condition that MCI not
accept BT traffic from the U.K. to the extent that
equal access had not been implemented in the
U.K 16 0
The Commission addressed a similar local com-
petition issue when considering the unbundling
of local exchange network elements and resale.
BT, unlike ILECs under Congress's 1996 Act, was
not required to unbundle network elements. 161
The U.K. government again argued that such a
policy would undermine its goals of facilities-
based competition. 162 The Commission, as ex-
pected, concluded that unbundling network ele-
ments fosters local competition and would limit
BT's ability to exercise market power.' 63 The
Commission, in this instance, was confident that
the U.K.'s failure to mandate unbundling would
be a short term problem and that World Trade
Organization ("WTO") and EC regulation to-
gether with policies encouraging competition
would mitigate its impact.
The FCC also concluded that BT's subsidiary,
Concert, would be strengthened by the merger
and create more competition in the global seam-
151 See id.
152 See Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 19985,
para. 2.
153 See BT/MCI Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 15351, para. 15.
154 See id. para. 127.
155 See id.
156 See id.
157 See id. para. 183.
158 See id.
159 See id. para. 186.
160 See id. para. 191. The European Commission re-
quired the implementation of equal access by January 1,
.2000. See.id.
161 See id. para. 192.
162 See id. para. 194.
163 See id. para. 195.
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less market.' 64 Since BT/MCI I, the Commission
has recognized the global seamless market as an
"emerging product of worldwide geographic
scope. ' 1 6 5 The global seamless market is loosely
defined as a combination of voice, data, video and
other telecommunications services that can be of-
fered by a single source over an integrated inter-
national network that has the same qualities wher-
ever provided. 166 Global seamless services also
offer the advantage of single-source billing,167 a
major advantage for business and residential cus-
tomers. The Commission recognized, however,
that global seamless services were only available to
high-end business customers at present.' 68 It was
the FCC's interest in developing global seamless
services, similar to its desire to see cellular tech-
nology and markets further developed in the
AT&T/McCaw merger above, that made the mar-
ket a relevant and important part of the merger
analysis.
The applicants in BT/MCI were able to meet
the burden of enhancing competition in the tele-
communications market with significantly fewer
conditions than the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX merger
required. This was because there was competition
in the international transport market and U.K.
domestic market, unlike the New York City local
service market.
As discussed, the two mergers were fundamen-
tally different. Despite these differences the FCC
consistently applied the heightened standard cre-
ated in the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Order to the ap-
plicants in BT/MCI. While the merger of BT/
MCI was ultimately not consummated, the Com-
mission's analysis in the BT/MCI Order proves
helpful for other telecommunications companies
forging international alliances.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR COMPETITORS
We've got to draw the line first...We're looking at the
Bell Atlantic/NYNEX merger right now. We're cogitat-
ing about the BT/MCI merger right now. The way you
draw lines in antitrust is you make a decision here, you
make a decision there. They're like points, and when
you connect the dots they're like lines. 169
The lines Reed Hundt references are being
drawn through a public interest analysis that is
164 See id. para. 15.
165 See id. para. 56 (citing BT/MCI I, 9 FCC Rcd. at 569;
Sprint Declaratory Ruling, 11 FCC Rcd. at 1864).
166 See id.
much broader than the traditional antitrust analy-
sis. Competition used to be one element the FCC
considered when it evaluated whether public in-
terest concerns would be met in a telecommunica-
tions merger. Competitive concerns now domi-
nate the public interest analysis the Commission
conducts when approving a telecommunications
merger. The Commission, with a push from Capi-
tol Hill, has found that it is not enough for the
public interest to lie merely in not allowing a de-
crease in competition, but in actually promoting
competition in the communications sector. The
public interest standard allows the FCC the flexi-
bility of imposing narrowly tailored conditions on
telecommunications mergers to further specific
policy goals.
Hundt's speeches on telecommunications
mergers in the summer of 1997 indicate that
merger issues will continue to rank high on the
Commission's agenda. As various combinations
seek FCC approval, the burden of proving en-
hanced competition will likely endure. The case
studies illustrate that merger applicants will meet
this heightened burden if they are willing to agree
to conditions that will promote competition. Cre-
ativity in designing conditions further help appli-
cants, in local markets particularly. The Bell At-
lantic/NYNEX merger highlighted the major
issues the Commission is concerned with in pro-
moting local competition. These include OSS
and network element pricing as well as other
methods of facilitating CLEC entry into local mar-
kets. Merger applicants are also helped when
they can illustrate that the competitor being elimi-
nated would not have been that strong because
there were other strong competitors or that the
potential competitor would have been a weak
one. Still other concerns, like anti-competitive be-
havior and emerging technologies and markets,
will continue to be an important part of the Com-
mission's public interest analysis in telecommuni-
cations mergers. Merger applicants benefit if they
explain how their merger benefits emerging tech-
nologies in a way that would promote economic
as well as technological competition and innova-
tion.
Hundt set out one clear limit in barring an
167 See id.
168 See id. 57.
169 Allan Sloan, The Lost World, NEWSWEEK, June 9, 1997,
at 52 (quoting FCC Chairman Reed Hundt).
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AT&T/RBOC merger. Subsequent FCC chair-
men will be tasked with drawing finer lines to de-
termine when consolidation in the telecommuni-
cations sector has become anti-competitive. At
some level, mergers run the risk of defeating the
competitive goals of the 1996 Act. If this limit
were fully realized the public interest would surely
not be served. Future FCC chairmen and com-
missioners should be encouraged to enforce
merger limits and not bow to industry pressure to
always design conditions that make mergers pro-
competitive. By enforcing merger limits the Com-
mission should send a clear message to industry
leaders that the FCC is more impressed with a
company's business plan when it concentrates on
entering new markets and opening their own
rather than looking for more business partners.
V. CONCLUSION
The FCC's public interest standard has taken
many different forms in response to political, eco-
nomic, social and technological changes. These
changes are illustrated by how the Commission
has made public interest determinations when ap-
proving telecommunications mergers. The 1996
Act's mandate to promote competition prompted
the FCC to change the burden of telecommunica-
tions merger applicants to make mergers pro-
competitive. Implementation of the Act caused
the Commission to place competition at the top
of its public interest concerns when evaluating
telecommunications mergers. Whether the Com-
mission's actions advances the public interest re-
mains to be seen.
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